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T HE Sixtieth Texas Legislature met in regular session in 1967 and en-
acted a substantial amount of legislation in the corporate field. Much of
this legislation was drafted by the Committee on Corporate Law of the
Texas State Bar Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law.
The legislation drafted by the Committee consisted of three bills: Senate
Bill 132, containing amendments to the Texas Business Corporation Act;
Senate Bill 131, making some changes in the Texas Non-Profit Corpora-
tion Act; and Senate Bill 133, which repealed prior legislation codified as
Article 1524.1 All three bills became effective on June 17, 1967.
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Treatment of Surplus in Reorganization. Generally, under the TBCA,
cash dividends can be paid "only out of the unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus of the corporation." 3 Nevertheless, in case of mergers, con-
solidations, and acquisitions, an earned surplus of the issuing corporation
frequently must be capitalized to accomplish the reorganization. Since one
or both of the corporations involved might have an earned or capital sur-
plus, it would be helpful if the successor or resulting corporation could
allocate either or both of these surpluses to its own earned surplus. Such
an allocation would allow the reorganization to be accomplished while not
depriving shareholders of the acquiring corporation of their expectation
of dividends.
In case of mergers and consolidations, the "net surplus of the merging
or consolidating corporations which was available for the payment of
dividends immediately prior to such merger or consolidation, to the extent
that such surplus is not transferred to stated capital or capital surplus by
the issuance of shares or otherwise, shall continue to be available for the
payment of dividends by such surviving or new corporation."4
Previously, the TBCA did not expressly authorize the same treatment
for surpluses in acquisitions as was authorized in mergers and consolida-
tions. The 1967 amendment to the definition of "earned surplus" in the
Act now helps to put acquisitions on the same footing as mergers and con-
solidations by providing that, "Earned surplus shall include also any por-
tion of surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers, consolidations or
acquisitions of all or substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the
property and assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign.'
* A.B., Baylor University; A.M., Wellesley College; LL.B., Baylor University. Professor of Law,
Baylor University.
1 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 656, at 1716-17; id. ch. 657, at 1717-29; id. ch. 658, at 1730-32.2Id. ch. 656, at 1717; id. ch. 657, at 1729; id. ch. 658, at 1732.
3 TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.38A(1) (1956).
4 1d. art. 5.06(7).5 Id. art. 1.02A(13), as amended, Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 1, at 1718.
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The express authority, with the limitations thereon, to allocate a capital
surplus to an earned surplus in case of mergers, consolidations, or acquisi-
tions is found in a new section D added to article 2.17, TBCA.!
Vote in Mergers, Consolidations, and Sales of Assets. Articles 5.03, 5.07,
and 5.10 of the TBCA were amended to provide that the majority vote
required in cases of mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets will be
two-thirds instead of four-fifths.'
Dissolution. The former requirement of a four-fifths vote for a voluntary
dissolution by corporate action has been changed to a two-thirds vote.!
Correspondingly, voluntary dissolution proceedings instituted can be re-
voked by a two-thirds vote.' The contents of the articles of dissolution, for-
merly contained in article 6.11, are now found in article 6.06.'° Proce-
dure for the filing of the articles of dissolution is now outlined in article
6.07.1
Previously, the statutory procedure for dissolution involved, first, the
consent or vote to dissolve; then the filing of the declaration of intent to
dissolve; followed by liquidation proceedings; and concluded by the filing
of articles of dissolution. The problem with that procedure was that law-
yers refused to follow it. They persistently forwarded to the Secretary of
State their declaration of intent and their articles of dissolution in one
packet, obviously eliminating any interim period for the liquidation. Be-
cause this practice left so many loose ends, the Committee included in the
1961 Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act an article to allow the
corporate existence to extend for the period of time reasonably necessary
for liquidation" and Part VI of the TBCA has been amended to eliminate
the requirement for a declaration of intent to dissolve.
Former article 6.04 has been repealed; in its place is a new article 6.04
which contains substantially the liquidation provisions formerly included
in article 6.06." Liquidation should now take place "before filing articles
of dissolution"'" instead of "after filing of statement of intent to dissolve.""
An added requirement is that the corporation, after voting to dissolve, shall
cease to carry on its business, except insofar as may be necessary for the
winding up thereof.
Former article 6.05, "Effect of Statement of Intent to Dissolve," has
been repealed and a new article 6.05 substituted.' The new article con-
'Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, S 4A, at 1719.7 Id. ch. 657, §§ 9, 10, 11, at 1720.
'TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.03, as amended, Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, 5 14, at 1724-
25. 9TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.15, as amended, Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, 5 14, at 1725-
26.
"' Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 14, at 1726.
"Id. ch. 657, § 14, at 1727. Articles 6.08-6.12 were repealed. Id.
"See Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1302-6.07 (1962).
'"Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 14, at 1725.
14 Id.
"TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.06 (1956).
"eTex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 14, at 1725.
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tains the procedure for revoking the voluntary dissolution proceedings,
whether such proceedings were undertaken with unanimous written con-
sent or by corporate action. Since the Secretary of State need not be ad-
vised that voluntary dissolution proceedings have been instituted, he need
not be notified that they have been revoked, and no filing of the revoca-
tion is now required.
In 1959 the Texas Legislature transferred the collection and adminis-
tration of franchise taxes from the office of the Secretary of State to that
of the Comptroller of Public Accounts.17 As a consequence, upon the vol-
untary dissolution of a corporation, the Secretary of State could not refer
to his own records to determine whether franchise taxes were current. To
supply him with this required information, articles 6.01 and 6.07 have been
amended to provide that articles of dissolution must be accompanied with
a certificate from the Comptroller that all franchise taxes have been paid."
Amendment of Articles of Incorporation. It is frequently the experience
of incorporators that, after articles of incorporation have been filed and
before any shares have been issued or subscribed for and before any busi-
ness has commenced, a need to amend the articles is discovered. To allow
such an amendment by incorporators, a new section C has been added to
article 4.02, TBCA, which provides: "The articles of incorporation may
also be amended by the unanimous written consent of the incorporators of
a corporation which has not commenced business and which has not issued
any shares or accepted any subscriptions."'"
Dissenting Shareholders. The practitioner trying to keep up with the time
schedule for certain actions to be taken in connection with the procedure
required for fixing the rights of a dissenting shareholder as established in
article 5.12 often met himself coming back. He sometimes found that the
statute required the corporation to accept or reject a dissenting sharehold-
er's valuation before it had even received such valuation. The amendments
to sections A and B of article 5.12, TBCA, provide a new and more orderly
time schedule in which the various actions by the dissenting shareholders
and by the corporation are to be taken."5
Under article 5.12C, the court was authorized to appoint "a qualified
appraiser." Because the ends of justice occasionally require that there be
more than one appraiser, this section has been amended to authorize the
court to appoint "one or more qualified appraisers." 1 Under statutes of
other states, the number of appraisers varies from "one or more" to
,,three. ,, sa
7 See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7084, 7084b(1) (1960).
'aTex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 14, at 1724, 1727.
"Id. ch. 657, 5 7, at 1719.2
0Id. ch. 657, 55 12A, 12B, at 1721-22.
21 Id. ch. 657, 5 12C, at 1722.
a1See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 74, 5 2.02(5) (1960) for reference to the various
state statutes. In Delaware, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Washington and Puerto Rico the court ap-
points one appraiser. In California, Connecticut, Hawaii, New York and Virginia the court has the
option to appoint one or more appraisers. In Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada,
1968 ]
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In 1963 the Texas Supreme Court held in Farnsworth v. Massey' that
where the statutory appraisal procedure had not been followed, a dissenting
shareholder had the right to have a jury determine the fair value of his
shares. This opinion created a spirited debate as to whether or not the
appraisal procedure provided in article 5.12 was or was not the exclusive
remedy for the dissenting shareholder.
In a few states, appraisal is the shareholder's exclusive remedy. 4 In
other states, where the statutes contain no express exclusion of other reme-
dies, the courts have held that statutory appraisal is the exclusive remedy
in the absence of fraud."5 Statutes in other states allow a dissenter to chal-
lenge the validity of the reorganization for fraud or irregularity, after
which he may or may not have a right to follow a statutory appraisal
remedy. ' "
In Farnsworth there was apparently only one dissenting shareholder. If
there had been two or more shareholders, each with the election to have his
shares valued by an appraiser or by a jury, and each with an option either
to join with other shareholders in an appraisal proceeding or to bring a
separate suit, complications and confusion would arise. The purpose of
article 5.12 is to provide "for one forum where all claims for appraisal
may be consolidated, regardless of claimants' places of residence, thus elim-
inating a multiplicity of action in various courts which is harmful to
corporation and shareholders alike."" In revising the article to further this
purpose the Committee was of the opinion that when a dissenting share-
holder seeks to recover only the fair value of his shares (even though he
might label his remedy a suit for damages), then, in the absence of fraud,
appraisal proceedings should be the exclusive remedy. The Committee did
not believe that any statutory limitation or penalty should be placed on
the right to challenge the validity or regularity of the procedure by which
the corporate reorganization was accomplished. Section G has been added
to article 5.12 with provisions designed to achieve these results."
Rights of Dissenting Shareholders. Under article 5.13A of the 1955 ver-
sion of TBCA, a shareholder who began the dissent procedure continued to
"have all the rights and privileges incident to" his shares until payment was
made or tendered. Foremost among these advantages was the right to vote
his shares. When a shareholder in Company A dissented from the merger
of Company A with Company B, his right to vote was theoretical rather
than practical. After the merger was accomplished, he held a certificate for
New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Vermont three appraisers are appointed, one by the share-
holders, one by the corporation and the third by the first two. In Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Carolina the court appoints three appraisers.
2a 3 6 5 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1963).24 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 74, 5 2.02(2) (1960) for reference to the statutes
in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
's See id. § 74, 5 3.02 for reference to court decisions in various jurisdictions.
26 Id. § 74, 5 2.02. Compare Comment of Bar Committee on TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5.14 (1956) (now art. 5.15 (1967)).
J22 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 74, 5 4 (1960).2
' Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 657, § 12, at 1723.
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shares in Company A, which has ceased to exist, and his dissent proclaimed
that he opposed becoming a shareholder in the survivor, Company B. If the
effect of article 5.13A was to make him a quasi-shareholder in Company
B, then he had a right to vote in a corporation with which he had declared
he wanted nothing to do.
The dissenting shareholder was entitled to any cash dividends in the in-
terim, but the dividends were applied as a credit on payment for his
shares." If the dividend was a stock dividend he would receive no addi-
tional value, since his shares were valued as of the day before the vote was
taken authorizing the corporate action." Consequently, the right to divi-
dends, too, was an empty one.
The statutory continuation of "rights and privileges" was not really
effective and could be troublesome. Other states have taken a more realistic
attitude towards the status of a shareholder after dissent and before pay-
ment. In seventeen states, after such shareholder has demanded payment,
his only right is the right to receive payment."1 In three states, after the
effective date of the merger, his only right is to receive payment.3
The 1967 amendments delete sections A and B of article 5.13 and sub-
stitute new language. Under the new section A, the only rights of a dissent-
ing shareholder, after his demand for payment, are his right to receive
payment and his right to maintain any appropriate action to obtain relief
for fraud in the reorganization action. It is expressly provided that voting
rights no longer exist."
Another problem under the old provision involved sale of shares held by
a dissenting shareholder. After demand, the dissenting shareholder still
held his certificate which could be transferred to a good faith purchaser
for value without notice of the dissent. Since the shares were disenfran-
chised, the purchaser had no right to vote and he would be disappointed
and the corporation embarrassed. To avoid this contingency, a new article
5.13B was enacted.' Under this section a dissenting shareholder is required
to submit his certificate to the corporation for a notation thereon that a
demand for payment has been made. If the shareholder does not submit
the certificate, the corporation is given the right to terminate his right to
payment. A court of competent jurisdiction, for good and sufficient cause,
is authorized to restore the right to payment. A purchaser who buys a cer-
tificate with a notation of dissent thereon has not bought shares; he only
takes an assignment of the dissenting shareholder's rights.
The position of the dissenting shareholder after demand for payment is
not frozen. Under a new article 5.13C, he may withdraw his demand for
payment (1) before payment, (2) before the petition for appraisal is
filed, or (3) after such petition is filed, if the corporation consents. Under
29 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.13B (1956).
3 Id. art. 5.12A(1).
"lSee 2 MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 74, 5 2.02(8) (1960) for reference to the statutes
in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nevada, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Puerto Rico.
32 See note 31 supra for reference to the statutes in Hawaii, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.3




this section, the right to payment may be terminated if the shareholder
fails to send in his certificate for notation of his demand, if no petition to
determine the value of his shares is filed within the prescribed time, or if
the court should find that he is not entitled to payment. In the event the
demand is withdrawn or the right to payment terminated, the shareholder
occupies the same shareholder status he would have occupied had he voted
for the reorganization, except that he has no right to prejudice any cor-
porate proceedings which may have been taken in the interim. If dividends
were paid or other distribution made to shareholders in the interim, he
shall be entitled to receive his share.3
Section D of the original article 5.13 has been deleted. Under that sec-
tion, it was possible for a corporation to terminate the shareholder's right
to payment by an abandonment or a rescission of the reorganization pro-
ceedings. This deletion prevents a corporation from depriving a shareholder
of his right to payment by unilateral action. If a corporation abandons the
reorganization or votes to rescind, the dissenting shareholder now has the
election to pursue his right to payment or to return to his status as share-
holder. If he were denied the right to return to such status, this denial
might constitute very strong evidence to support his cause of action against
the corporation for fraud.
Registered Agent. Frequently registered agents of corporations serve as
such for many corporations. Under old article 2.10, TBCA, if these agents
changed their addresses, even though within the same city, this change
could be accomplished only with action by the board of directors of each
of the corporate clients represented, followed by the filing of the change
with the Secretary of State. If such change of address would affect the
venue of suits brought against the corporation, the need for corporate ap-
proval is apparent. However, if the change is from one place in the county
to another place in the same county, the need for such corporate action does
not arise. Yet to accomplish the change under the old requirements in-
volved time, effort, and expense and constituted an unnecessary burden.
To lift this burden, article 2.10.1 was added which permits an agent to
effect a change of address within a county by giving ten days notice thereof
to the corporations involved followed by the filing of a statement of change
of address with the Secretary of State. "
Action Without Meetings. The increased tempo of modern living has af-
fected corporations. It frequently is to the corporation's interest to have
an immediate decision on a matter of policy at a time when it is not pos-
sible to have a meeting of the board of directors. In such cases, the corpora-
tion could act if the directors were able to dispense with the necessity of a
meeting and consent in writing to the desired action. A new section B has
been added to article 9.10 to provide that unanimous written consent of
35 Id.
30 Id. ch. 657, S 4, at 1718-19. The new section D added to article 8.09 allows the registered
agent of a foreign corporation the same opportunity to resign as is allowed the agent of a domestic
corporation under article 2.10D. Id. ch. 657, § 16, at 1727-30.
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directors or of members of an executive committee may be substituted for
a meeting. If a corporation does not want its directors to be so empowered,
the corporation may restrict this statutory authority in its articles of in-
corporation or by-laws."
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT3 8
Prior to the adoption of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act in 1959,
statutes governing such corporations were sketchy or non-existent in the
areas dealing with meetings of boards of trustees or directors. Such rules
as there were for these organizations were found in their "charters" or in
their "constitution-and-by-laws," and were rules based on a common
agreement or understanding. Meetings were informal and casual. Under
the 1959 Act, such meetings became matters controlled by statute, and
many non-profit corportions frequently found themselves unable to func-
tion because of the inability to comply with the statutory requirements.
Many such corporations prefer large boards of directors, but do not anti-
cipate that all or even most of the directors named will participate in the
management of the affairs of the corporation. Even when a majority of
the board could be assembled, sometimes a particular action could not be
taken in the absence of unanimity because of a statutory requirement that
such action be taken by the vote of a majority of the number of directors.
The difficulty in rounding up a quorum and in meeting the statutory vot-
ing requirements presented very real problems to many non-profit corpora-
tions.
Senate Bill 131, effective June 17, 1967, amends article 2.17 of the
Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act to allow a corporation to fix its own
quorum of directors, in its articles or its by-laws, so long as the quorum
is not less than three. To assist in securing those "majority of the number
of directors" votes, the corporation may also provide for proxy voting of
directors, but proxies may not be counted to make a quorum. Directors'
proxies are limited in duration to three months and are revocable unless
they are expressly made irrevocable, and unless otherwise made irrevocable
by law.
Another problem area for non-profit corporations was that of vesting
non-directors with a power of management. There were many non-profit
corporations whose boards did not include persons who were experienced
in certain business and professional fields where the organization might
need expert management and advice. To enable the non-profit corporation
to secure the necessary "outside" assistance, article 2.18 of the Non-Profit
Corporation Act dealing with committees of directors was amended to
allow a minority of committee members to be non-directors. These mixed
committees must be authorized by the articles or by-laws and by the vote
of a majority of directors in office. Note that the vote required is not the
majority of the number of directors.
a7 Id. ch. 657, § 17, at 1728. This amendment is patterned after a similar provision in the
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW OF DELAWARE art. 141(f) (1967).38 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 656, at 1716-17.
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Another area in which the existing statutes allowed no flexibility was
that of the election of directors of a corporation which serves as an ad-
junct of another corporation and which has no members of its own. For
example, a non-profit hospital might establish a non-profit clinic; a non-
profit university might establish a non-profit art museum; or a church
might establish a non-profit youth center. A new section E was added to
article 2.15 which will allow the hospital, the university, or the church to
elect the board of directors (in whole or in part) of the clinic, the art mu-
seum, or the youth center, where the articles of the latter so provide. 9
III. REPEAL OF ARTICLE 1524a40
In its work in connection with drafting the Texas Business Corporation
Act, the Committee originally took the position that the loan companies
governed by article 1524a constituted a "particular kind of corporation"
over which the Committee had only limited jurisdiction. This attitude is
reflected in section B of article 9.15, TBCA, which provides that:
[A]ny special limitations, obligations, liabilities and powers applicable to a
particular kind of corporation for which special provision is made by the laws
of this State, including ... those corporations subject to supervision under
Article 1524a of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, shall continue to be
applicable to any such corporation, and this Act is not intended to repeal
and does not repeal the statutory provision providing for these special limita-
tions, obligations, liabilities, and powers."
The "supervision" referred to is that of the Banking Commissioner.
Among the "one or more purposes" for which article 1524a companies
could be incorporated were to accumulate and lend money, to deal in notes,
bonds and securities, to act as trustee in an express trust or under court
appointment, to act as agent, to buy and sell shares, bonds and other secur-
ities, to borrow money, and to issue debentures." Drafters of purpose
clauses for corporations incorporated under the TBCA frequently included
one or more of these purposes. Then the client, operating a retail shoe
store or a furniture manufacturing plant, would be notified by the Bank-
ing Commissioner that his business was now subject to the supervision of
the Banking Commissioner. Following this notification, the client was apt
to steam into his lawyer's office demanding to know why his business was
any business of the Banking Commissioner. The embarrassed lawyer would
have to advise his client that he would have to be so supervised or that the
articles of incorporation would have to be amended to delete the mischief-
making clause. Lawyers appealed to the Committee to take action to pro-
tect them from this embarrassment and the Committee undertook to se-
cure the repeal of article 1524a, the continued existence of which was
so great a nuisance to the ordinary business corporation.
39 Id.
4Id. ch. 658, at 1730-32.
4 1 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.15 (1956).
4 2 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302, 1303b were repealed in 1961. The publishers have,




A second problem with this troublesome article motivated the legisla-
ture to attempt its repeal in 1963. The Texas Regulatory Loan Act' pro-
vided, in sections 29 and 30, that article 1524a would not apply to licen-
ses under that Act and that article 1524a was repealed. However, the
Texas Supreme Court, in Allied Finance Co. v. Falkner," expressly approved
the holding of the court of civil appeals that the provisions of these sections
of that Bill did not conform to the caption and were, therefore, unconstitu-
tional and void. As a result, article 1524a companies, even though licensed
as lending companies under the 1963 Act and thus subject to the supervi-
sion of the Regulatory Loan Commissioner, were subject, as 1524a compa-
nies, to the supervision of the Banking Commissioner as well. The repeal of
article 1524a consequently served the double purpose of avoiding the ob-
viously unintended result of subjecting ordinary business corporations to
the supervision of the Banking Commissioner and of accomplishing the
purpose of the legislature in its enactment of section 30 of the Regulatory
Loan Act."
IV. OTHER LEGISLATION
Voting Rights of a Class. Under article 2.29, TBCA, recognition is
given to the authority to limit or deny the voting rights of the shares
of any class. This is limited by article 4.03A(7), which provides that
the holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote
on a proposed amendment to the articles "whether or not entitled to vote
thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation" when such
amendment would create a new class of shares. Many corporations operat-
ing under the TBCA accomplish their financing by issuing new classes of
preferred shares from time to time as the need arises. Either their articles
do not contain a provision for the authorization of "blank shares" under
article 2.13, or else such provisions would not fit their particular situation.
These corporations have included in their articles and printed on their cer-
tificates a denial of the right of these shareholders to vote on a subsequent
amendment to allow the issuance of a new series of shares. Under old
article 4.03, these shareholders had the right to vote even in the face of this
express provision. This statutory right made it difficult for such corpora-
tions to secure additional capital since the holders of outstanding shares
would frequently oppose the issuance of new shares having rights equal or
superior to those of the prior shares, or would demand, as the price of their
vote, an amendment of the articles to up-grade their shares. New article
'Tex. Laws 1963, ch. 205, at 550, codified as TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6165b,
repealed by Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 274, at 659.
44397 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1965).
'The Committee found that the repeal was not as simple a matter as expected. Trust com-
panies organized under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1513a (1965) were, by the terms of that
article, made subject to the supervisory provisions of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1524a
and these companies desired to continue to be subject to that supervision because of some income
tax benefits available to them by reason of their banking relationship. Therefore, article 1513a
was first amended to lift the supervisory provisions from article 1524a and incorporate them in
article 1513a, and then article 1524a was, at long last, repealed. Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 658, 5
1, 2, at 1730-32. This bill was passed by the legislature and approved by the Governor on June 17,
1967, on which date it became effective.
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4.03C eliminates this problem, providing in effect that if the articles of in-
corporation deny the right to vote in such cases, the shareholders do not
have the right to vote. '
Usury. A new article 2.09 has been added to the Texas Miscellaneous
Corporation Laws Act."7 The new provision prohibits a corporation from
asserting a claim or defense of usury where it borrows $5,000 or more
in one loan or a series of connected loans and agrees to pay interest at a
rate not to exceed one and one-half per cent per month. The terms of the
new Consumer Credit Code48 provide that loans of up to $2,500 to a cor-
poration may be made repayable in installments at a rate of ten per cent per
annum plus an add-on interest charge not to exceed $8 per $100. Unan-
swered is the question whether corporate loans in excess of $2,500 but
less than $5,000 are now subject to the ten per cent interest limitation.
"Going Out of Business Sale." Judging from the 1967 legislation, the leg-
islature apparently believes that a business which advertises a "going out of
business sale" should have the simple decency to go out of business. A new
provision of the Texas Penal Code makes it unlawful for anyone "to
fraudulently represent that he is going out of business."'" To prevent such
frauds, every person conducting such a sale is required to secure a permit,
good for 120 days, with the privilege of renewal for another 120 days. In
each case, a sworn and detailed inventory of the goods to be sold must be
filed with the county or city tax assessor or collector, who is authorized to
issue the permit. Under the Consumer Protection Code, the "advertising
of a liquidation sale, auction sale or other sale fraudulently representing
that the person is going out of business"5 is unlawful. The Consumer
Credit Commissioner is authorized, upon receiving a written complaint, to
request the Attorney General to restrain such practices by securing a tem-
porary or permanent injunction. A violation of the injunction carries with
it a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 per violation. 1 The penalty for
violating the Penal Code provision is a fine of not less than $200, with
each separate day's violation constituting a separate offense."
Share Ownership-Right of Survivorship. The legislature adopted an act
in 1963 which permitted a corporation, with respect to shares owned
jointly with a right of survivorship, to treat the survivor as the owner
until it received written notice of a contrary claim. This legislation was
codified in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act"a and was inadvertently re-
pealed by the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965. It was re-enacted by the
Sixtieth Legislature. "
46 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 663, S 1, at 1758.
4
7Id. ch. 296, at 713.
41 Id. ch. 274, at 608. See art. 4.01, id. at 627.
9Id. ch. 434, § 2, at 1004.
0 Id. ch. 10, at 658.
5 Id. at 659.
5"Id. ch. 434, § 2, at 1004.
5'TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-6.04 (1962).




Taxation. Several of the 1967 acts provided for additional tax exemp-
tions. Under one,"5 churches which engage in "the dissemination of infor-
mation on a religious faith through radio, television, and similar media of
communication" are accorded a tax exemption on the personal property,
buildings and attached grounds necessary for accomplishing such activities.
Another gives an exemption from the state property tax to non-profit cor-
porations organized as societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. 6
A third provides exemption to "the property of all fraternal organizations
• . .so long as the property is owned and used for charitable, benevolent,
religious, and educational purposes, and is not in whole or in part leased
out to others, or otherwise used with a view to profit."" The exemption
does not apply to property of fraternal organizations which pay any type
of insurance benefits to their members nor to those which engage in any
political activity in behalf of or opposed to a candidate for public office.
Although not a tax exemption, a tax benefit is provided in another area.
All intangible personal property of any trust forming a part of a pension
plan, disability or death benefit plan, profit sharing or stock bonus plan is
to be valued for tax purposes by deducting from the total valuation of
its assets the gross amount held for the satisfaction of liabilities to em-
ployees and their beneficiaries."
Workmen's Compensation. Executive officers of a corporation may be
covered by workmen's compensation insurance under an amendment of
that act.' Officers can receive the benefits of such insurance if their cor-
poration is a subscriber, and if the coverage is specifically included in the
contract. However, in determining whether a corporation has three or
more employees, the executive officer shall "under no circumstances" be
counted as an employee.
V. THE 1967 CASE LAW DEALING WITH CORPORATIONS
During the past year, corporate litigation in Texas continued in the pat-
tern outlined in the first annual Survey. That is, "the majority of the cor-
porate cases reported last year dealt with questions typical of the small
corporation." Again, the cases involved a great variety of issues. In an
attempt to preserve the continuity of the annual Survey, the author of
this report will follow, as nearly as may be, the functional categories estab-
lished by Professor Pelletier. "
The Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors. The Dallas court of civil
appeals in Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra"' was called upon
"Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 336, 5 1, at 802, to be codified as TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
7150-1(a) (1967).
56Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 310, 5 1, at 742, to be codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
7150-7 (1967).
"
7 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 105, 1 , at 319.
5 8 Id. ch. 194, § 1, at 429, to be codified as TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7244a (1967).
39 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 192, S 1, at 426-27.
" Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134 (1967).
a' Id.
"s 4 1 0 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
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to decide whether a corporation had established its right to a cancellation
of two assignments of applications for letters patent. The corporation con-
tended that its president, without authority, had made a gratuitous transfer
of a corporate asset. The defendants claimed that the corporation never
really owned the asset since it was transferred to the corporation in order
to place it beyond the reach of creditors of the transferor with the under-
standing that when the threat from such creditors subsided the patent
rights would be returned to the debtor. The jury found, in favor of the
defendant, that the original transfer to the corporation was not based on
consideration. On remand from the supreme court, the court of civil
appeals found evidence to support this jury finding and concluded that the
original transfer to the corporation was invalid.
The corporation also alleged that the "resolution of the board" under
which the president purported to act had never been presented to and
adopted by the board. The meeting of the board relevant to the issue
occurred on January 8, 1963. There was testimony that the president pre-
pared the minutes of this meeting, which minutes included the resolution
in dispute, and had the secretary sign them on February 15, 1963. The
secretary testified that the first notice he had of the resolution reached him
sometime in June of that year and that the board "rescinded" the resolu-
tion in July. The jury found that after January 8, 1963, the board of
directors were "informed as to contents of" the corporate resolution and
subsequently failed to act as ordinary prudent persons would have acted.
The court of civil appeals thought that these findings would support an
estoppel or a ratification of the unauthorized act. The reported evidence
does not clearly indicate how soon after January 8 the board received
notice; this would seem to be a material fact. The supreme court has
granted writ of error.
In another case, 3 Brunswick Corporation sued in federal court for debt
and to foreclose a mortgage on the bowling equipment of an incorporated
bowling alley. The federal court enjoined the manager of the bowling lanes
from continuing the operation thereof. Within a week after he ceased such
operation the manager, as a shareholder of the corporation, petitioned in a
Texas district court for a receiver for the corporation on the statutory
ground that the corporate assets were being wasted and misapplied by the
directors. His complaint alleged that the failure of the board of directors
to reopen and operate the business would result in the wasting of corporate
assets and an abandonment of the corporate purpose. The trial court
appointed a receiver. The court of civil appeals held that the facts alleged
were not inconsistent with the honest exercise of business judgment and
would not support the charges of misapplication and waste, nor the other
charges of illegality, oppression and fraud."4
The petitioner had also charged that the board was guilty of fraud
against the corporation because the board had hired as attorney for the
corporation a lawyer who also represented a competing corporation. The




court pointed out that "within very narrow limits"" lawyers may repre-
sent clients having adverse interests, so that the petitioner's allegations were
insufficient to establish a case of fraud. Another charge was that two of
the directors had taken a conveyance of the corporate real property to
themselves for the purpose of obtaining a loan for the corporation but
that no loan had been obtained. It appears that this complaint is being
litigated in still another court proceeding."8 The appellate court pointed
out that, under article 7.05, TBCA, the receivership sought by the peti-
tioner could not be resorted to unless all other remedies were inadequate.
Since, for all that appears, this other suit might afford relief, the court
held that the receivership remedy was not available." The trial court had
granted the receivership without a hearing and the appellate court reversed
and remanded.
It would seem to the casual reader that this corporation's principal
trouble was that it did not have any money. The petitioner might have
had better luck with his receivership had he predicated his claim on the fact
that the corporation was insolvent or in imminent danger of insolvency. 8
Disregard of the Corporate Entity. In the past year there seems to have
been much less "piercing of the corporate veil" litigation than usual. There
were two cases involving a creditor's attempt to hold an individual liable
for a corporate debt; in neither was it necessary for the court to decide
whether the facts were such as to require a disregard of the corporate
entity to achieve justice. In one,"9 the plaintiff had originally filed suit
against a corporate defendant which subsequently went bankrupt. The
plaintiff then filed a claim as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Apparently, when the corporation was discharged in bankruptcy, the
plaintiff's debt remained unpaid. The plaintiff then amended the original
petition to allege that an individual defendant was jointly and severally
liable with the corporation. The trial court sustained the individual de-
fendant's plea that the plaintiff was bound by its election to proceed
against the corporation, and the court of civil appeals affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
In the second case,"0 a creditor sued a corporation and an individual.
The latter pleaded that the debt sued on was a corporate, not an individual,
obligation. The individual defendant had started his business as a pro-
prietorship and had done business with the plaintiff in that capacity. The
proprietorship was then incorporated without a change in name, unless
the addition of "Inc." to the original name could be considered a change.





8 TEx. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05A(1) (a) (1956).
"International Shoe Co. v. Marcus, Inc., 410 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.




the relevant statute was not met." The court declared: "It is our view that
Article 1302-2.02 means exactly what it says. It states in unmistakably
clear language that 'Until such notice has been so published for the full
period above-named, no change shall take place in the liability of such
firm or the members thereof.' ....
Nor was the court impressed with the individual's claim that the plain-
tiff had actual notice of the change of ownership. The evidence by which
defendant sought to establish actual notice to the plaintiff was that checks
sent to the plaintiff by the proprietorship were drawn by "The Ridgway
Co.-Special Account by W. 0. Ridgway" whereas the checks sent by the
corporation were drawn by "The Ridgway Co., Inc., by W. 0. Ridgway."
Said the court: "The checks did not convey actual knowledge or informa-
tion to appellant of the incorporation of appellee, nor did they relieve ap-
pellee of the duty of publishing the statutory notice. Furthermore, it is our
view that the mere receipt and deposit of the checks did not impose upon
appellant the duty of making inquiry."' 3
Occasionally courts are called upon to determine whether shareholders
have a right to demand that their existence and that of their corporation
should be considered one existence for their particular purpose. In a con-
demnation case," a corporation owned lot 12, adjoining both lot 13, owned
by the three shareholders of the corporation, and lot 14, owned by two of
these shareholders. Parts of lots 13 and 14 were condemned. The sharehold-
ers contended that their claim for damages for the taking should be for
damages to the consolidated tracts as a whole under the unity-of-use doc-
trine. They planned to develop the three lots in the future for a single
purpose, a shopping center. The court refused to ignore the separate cor-
porate entity and held that there was not a unity of ownership necessary
to support the unity-of-use doctrine. Said the court: "[A] corporation is an
entity separate and apart from its stockholders and ownership of stock in a
corporation having title to property is not the same as individual owner-
ship by such stockholders.""3
Ultra Vires. For the first time in Texas an appellate court had occasion
to consider the statutory right of a shareholder to enjoin the performance
of an ultra vires obligation of a corporation." The plaintiff brought suit
against the corporation for the unpaid balance of a note executed by the
corporation. The corporation's defense was that the note was executed
"without authority" since the note involved the assumption by the cor-
poration of an individual debt owed by its president and that the note was
void under article 1348" since it was without valid consideration. A share-
" TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (1965).
"aAmerican Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Ridgway, 412 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref. n.r.e.
73 ld. at 678.
' Gossett v. State, 417 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
'71d. at 735. See California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591 (Ct. Cl. 1947). Unity
of ownership was not such a prerequisite for a consolidation of enterprise in a condemnation case.
"'Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"See TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1348 (1962).
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holder sought to intervene and enjoin the corporation's payment of the
note on the ground that the note was an ultra vires obligation. The trial
court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against the
corporation and dismissed the plea of intervention.
The note in question had been executed in the name of the corporation
by its president, Shively, pursuant to a resolution of the corporation's
board of directors. The resolution stipulated that the board "recognized"
the debt to Moody and stated that this debt was one incurred in the finan-
cing of a stock purchase by the corporation.78 The testimony summarized
in the opinion might support the conclusions that there was in fact no con-
sideration for the corporation's execution of the note, that the debt so
"recognized" by the board was in fact the personal obligation of the presi-
dent, and that it was the president who convinced the board that this was
a corporate debt. The writer, like the court, finds the maze of corporate
finance involved confusing, and wonders, unlike the court, how such evi-
dence could support a summary judgment against the corporation.
The court found that the defensive pleading that the note was executed
without authority was the equivalent of pleading that the note was ultra
vires. Under article 2.04A this plea was not available to the corporation as
the court concluded, but, under article 2.04B (1), an ultra vires under-
taking of a corporation may be enjoined by a shareholder if the court
should deem such remedy to be equitable. The court decided that the ar-
ticle was stated in broad enough language to authorize the shareholder to
intervene in a suit brought against the corporation and that such share-
holder was entitled to a hearing. Because the trial court had dismissed the
plea of intervention without a hearing, the case was reversed and remanded.
In 1955 a member of the Committee speculated that in a case where the
corporation itself could not rely on its own lack of power to defeat an ob-
ligation, "if the corporation can persuade one of its shareholders to take the
initiative, which is not too difficult, it has at least a fair chance to have the
ultra vires contract set aside and rendered harmless."7 The evidence in this
case indicates that there might have been some shopping around for a
shareholder who was willing to intervene. The shopping around seems to
have been done, however, not by the corporation, but by another share-
holder who did not want to intervene himself. On remand, the court in-
structed the trier of facts to determine whether the intervening shareholder
was the agent of the defendant corporation; if so, "then he would not be
entitled to the relief sought."8 Noting that the statutory right of the
shareholder to enjoin is conditioned on the court's finding such remedy to
be equitable, the court concluded that the shareholder might establish an
equity to the extent that he could show that the corporation received no
benefit from the note in question.
" Inter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
79 Trotti, Should an Existing Corporation Adopt the Act?-Panel Discussion, Proceedings, Texas
Business Corporation Act Institute (1955), in 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 455 (1964).




If the corporation received no benefit from the note, then is not the note
void as a "fictitious increase of indebtedness" under section 6 of article 12
of the Texas Constitution?s" In other words, would not the fact that the
corporation secured no benefit make its note "illegal" rather than "ultra
vires"? In two cases where the corporation contended that its note was
constitutionally void because the corporation had received no money, prop-
erty, or labor, the supreme court found that the corporation had received
the very "benefits" contracted for, so that there was no constitutional or
statutory violation.8 In the instant case the court found that "an inference
can be drawn that appellant received no direct benefit, certainly at least
from the note sued on."'" Is not the defense of "no consideration" avail-
able to a corporate defendant against the payee? By what reasoning does
this defense entitle a shareholder to enjoin payment? Is not the entire issue
of "ultra vires" in the instant case irrelevant?
The court of civil appeals remanded "the whole case."'" The supreme
court refused the writ of error, no reversible error. Could the supreme
court be taking the position that the remand was proper but that the rea-
sons for the remand were unsatisfactory?
Corporate Securities. During the last year, there have been several occa-
sions for appellate courts to construe pre-incorporation agreements relating
to promises to take shares in and promises to issue shares of corporations to
be formed. In one case, 5 suit was brought by a corporation against a sub-
scriber for payment of his subscription. The defense was failure of con-
sideration. The defendant alleged that he was induced to enter into the sub-
scription agreement by the representations of the promoter that the cor-
poration was to erect a downtown hotel, affording facilities for merchants
and professional offices, to be operated by local personnel. He claimed that
what the corporation did erect was an out-of-town motel, catering to the
tourist trade, and operated by a nationwide motel chain. The trial court
held that the variation between what the defendant had agreed to pay for
and what was actually produced was so material as to relieve the defendant
of liability. The appellate court found it difficult "to perceive either the
theory on which the case was tried by the parties, or their position on ap-
peal."" Despite this difficulty, the court concluded that the defendant had
established a "subscription on special terms" for the violation of which the
defendant was entitled to rescission and relief from liability.
In another series of cases the complaint was that a pre-incorporation
agreement entitled the plaintiff to shares which the corporation had not is-
" Tex. CONST. art. XII, § 6 reads: "No corporation shall issue stock or bonds except for
money paid, labor done or property actually received, and all fictitious increase of stock or in-
debtedness shall be void." This constitutional prohibition was incorporated into Trx. Ri.v. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1348 (1962), and is now codified as id. art. 1302-2.06 (1967).
" Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965); Richardson v. Bermuda
Land & Livestock Co., 231 S.W. 337 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921).
SaInter-Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
'
4 1d. at 591.




sued to him. In three of these cases, the plaintiff was to render services in
connection with the launching of the enterprise in exchange for shares in
the future corporation. In one of these,87 the plaintiff alleged that he was
supposed to receive one-third of the shares of a corporation to be formed
in consideration for his supervision of the organization of the business and
the repair and remodeling of the building which was to be bought. He al-
leged that he had performed but the other parties to the agreement refused
to issue him the shares. He sued for money damages, joining the corpora-
tion as a defendant. The trial court severed the plaintiff's cause of action
against the corporation from that against the incorporators and dismissed
the action against the corporation. The appellate court confirmed this
action, holding that where the suit was only for money damages for breach
of the contract, the corporation was not a proper party defendant.
In the second case,8" the plaintiff alleged that payment by the corpora-
tion of his real estate commission was to be, at his option, in cash or shares.
The president of the corporation had written a letter to the plaintiff, in
answer to plaintiff's inquiry, to advise him that a particular sale, the Matera
contract, "would fall within the purview of your contract" with the cor-
poration. This letter was introduced in evidence. The trial court, which
gave it the weight of an "admission" of liability, rendered summary judg-
ment for the plaintiff for "damages for the conversion of 26,462 2 shares"
in the sum of $52,925. There were pleadings and affidavits by the corpora-
tion that the Matera contract had not been performed and that the plaintiff
was not the producing cause of the contract. The trial court held that the
admission was conclusive and struck these corporate defenses. The appellate
court found that the letter did not meet two of the five tests required for
a "judicial admission" in that it was not written during the course of a
judicial proceeding and it was not a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal ad-
mission" of defendant's liability. 9 The court accordingly reversed and re-
manded for a trial on the merits, instructing the trial court that the letter
would constitute only a "quasi-admission," which could be rebutted.
In the third of these cases," a lawyer sued for 61,292.45 shares in the
defendant corporation or their value, amounting to $796,801.85, which he
claimed by reason of an oral agreement made in 1952. He alleged that, in
exchange for his legal services and his expenses in connection with organ-
izing, incorporating, financing, and constructing an integrated natural
gas pipeline in the United States, he was to have been paid "by being the
owner of shares of corporate stock in the enterprise" for which he would
pay the same amount of cash as was paid by the promoters for "founders'
87Peter v. 2117 Walker Corp., 417 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
88Texas Distillers, Inc. v. Howell, 409 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"5The other three tests are: (1) that the statement is contrary to an essential fact embraced
in the theory of recovery or defense asserted by the person giving the testimony; (2) that the
giving of conclusive effect to the declaration will be consistent with the public policy upon which
the rule is based; and (3) that the statement is not also destructive of the opposing party's theory
of recovery. The San Antonio court cited its own prior opinion establishing these tests, United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Carr, 242 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref., and the
subsequent Texas Supreme Court opinion adopting these tests, Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161
Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415 (1960).
9 5Krueger v. Young, 406 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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stock." There was evidence that, in 1954, the plaintiff performed his last
professional service and was paid in full for his services and expenses. The
appellate court entertained some doubt about the accuracy of the plaintiff's
memory. It pointed out that the defendant had shown that plaintiff's claim
"has progressed from one by which he claimed the right to buy a few
shares in June 1954, more shares in June 1958, to the right to buy 900
shares in December 1959, 7,359 shares in 1961 and 61,292.45 shares in
1965." 1 The trial court, after hearing the evidence, instructed a verdict
for the defendants. The higher court found that this instruction was justi-
fied on at least two grounds: (1) the oral agreement was in violation of the
statute of frauds since it was obvious that a promise to render such legal
services in connection with the organization and construction of an inte-
grated gas pipe line system was one which could not be performed in the
space of one year from the making thereof, and (2) the plaintiff's remedy
was barred by the statute of limitations.
The question in another case involving corporate securities"' was
whether, under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, title to certain stock cer-
tificates had been so effectively transferred as to defeat a writ of garnish-
ment. A judgment creditor had applied for a writ of garnishment on Au-
gust 28, 1962, on the judgment debtor's bank. The bank answered that it
held certain certificates in pledge for debts which the debtor owed the
bank and that it had been presented with an assignment, dated the pre-
ceding January, by which the debtor had transferred all his interest in the
shares to another person. The certificates, prior to the date of the assign-
ment, had been in the possession of the bank, together with signed stock
powers. The judgment creditor contended that there was no "delivery"
sufficient to vest the title to the shares in the transferee. The higher court
was of a different opinion, holding that:
[T]he circumstances of this case constitute 'delivery' of the certificates of
stock within the meaning of the statute. We do not believe that manual hand-
ing of these certificates by Lee to Damrel was necessary in order to pass the
title to the stock certificates. At the time the stock certificates were pledged by
Lee to secure the indebtedness due the Bank such certificates were accom-
panied by stock powers. The written assignment from Lee to Damrel com-
pleted the transfer of the title to the stock certificates. There is nothing in
the statute that requires the delivery of the stock certificates by the owner
of the stock directly to the transferee.93
On motion for rehearing, the judgment creditor convinced the court
that the date on which the assignment was handed to the bank does not
appear in the record and that this fact was material in determining whether
the assignment was handed to the bank before or after the service of the
writ of garnishment. The court reversed and remanded the case for a de-
termination of this date.
91 Id. at 757.
92Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Texas Nat'l Bank, 411 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
l Id. at 803. The statute referred to was TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-6.02 (1962).
This article is now superseded by Tax. UNIFORM COMM. CODE art. 8-308 (1967).
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Shareholders' Rights. In 1965, an amendment to article 12.1714 provided
a procedure for reviving the charters of corporations whose charters had
been forfeited for failure to pay franchise taxes. In a suit brought in the
name of the corporation under this article to revive a forfeited charter,"5
a shareholder intervened to protest that, as to him, the revival authorized
by the 1965 Act was unconstitutional. The appellate court agreed that,
upon the forfeiture of a corporate charter under the law applicable at the
time this charter was forfeited, the shareholders' rights to their distributive
share of assets became a vested property right, which could not constitu-
tionally be impaired by the subsequent statute. The 1965 amendment to
the franchise tax law does not contain a provision similar to the one in the
1961 Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act. 6 The 1961 Act author-
ized the continuation of a corporation whose period of duration had ex-
pired by an amendment of the articles and expressly provided that, "Such
expiration shall not of itself create any vested right on the part of any
shareholder, member, or creditor to prevent such action."97 Under the law
prior to 1961, the renewal of the charters of corporations whose terms had
expired was authorized upon the vote of a majority of the outstanding
shares.98 It would seem that if a majority of the shares could continue the
corporate existence, the minority shares did not have any vested property
right to have the corporation expire when its period of duration expired.
A point involved in an action for declaratory judgment" was whether
the owner of an undivided community half interest in shares had prop-
erly sought an inspection of the corporate books and records. In the course
of the trial, the attorney of the owner asked the plaintiff-witness if he
would permit the defendant to examine the corporate books for the pur-
pose of determining the fair value of the shares involved, to which ques-
tion the plaintiff answered "No." The trial court then refused the defend-
ant's request that the court find that she was entitled to such an examina-
tion. On the appeal, the court of civil appeals felt that such a demand was
not in compliance with the requirements of article 2.44, TBCA. Further,
the appellate court pointed out, after a proper statutory demand and a
refusal, the shareholder's remedy would be by mandamus.
Unexpected consequences sometimes follow the amendment of the draft
of a complicated code by a legislative committee. The original draft of the
TBCA provided for a two-thirds vote as the majority required in all those
areas where more than a simple majority was required. The House com-
mittee, with reference to voluntary dissolution, merger, consolidation, and
sale of assets, substituted their requirement of a four-fifths vote. No
change was made in the two-thirds requirement for an amendment of ar-
ticles (article 4.02, TBCA) nor in the two-thirds requirement for the issu-
ance of treasury shares to officers or employees (article 2.22D, TBCA).
"
4 TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17 (1965).
"Gano v. Filter-Aid Co., 414 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.07D (1962).
97 Id.
"Appendix to art. 1316a, 3 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 751 (1962).
"Yelverton v. Brown, 412 S.W.2d 325, 329-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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In a 1967 case, ' involving a construction of article 2.22D, a protest-
ing shareholder owned twenty-seven per cent of the outstanding preferred
shares of each of two corporations and was, therefore, in a position to block
a merger of the two. However, two-thirds of the other shares were voted in
favor of the issuance of enough treasury shares to an employee of the cor-
porations so that the protesting shareholder's percentage of ownership fell
below twenty per cent. With the vote of the employee's shares, the other
shareholders proceeded to merge. The appellate court held that such proce-
dure was authorized and that the merger was valid.
Also involved in the case was the validity of a contract among the
shareholders who were also the directors of the corporations. Under that
agreement the parties had bound themselves "as shareholders and directors"
not to borrow in excess of $50,000 except by unanimous vote. The trial
court held this contract void. The appellate court held that the agreement
was valid in so far as it bound the parties as shareholders, but was invalid
as it bound them as directors. At subsequent corporate meetings, extreme
care will have to be taken in specifying whether the meeting is one of
shareholders or of directors.
There were a number of Texas cases during the last year dealing with
venue of an action against a corporate defendant,'' with the matter of
jurisdiction of Texas courts over a foreign corporation, ' with taxation of
corporations,1 0 3 and with priority of creditors' claims in a corporate receiv-
ership.' ° Since the ultimate issues in these cases involve pleadings, proof,
and issues not identified with corporation law, they are not examined.
In bringing this annual Survey to a close, the author finds herself in
agreement with some of the more seasoned lawyers of her acquaintance.
Frequently they wish that there was some way to compel the legislature
and the courts to take a recess until the practitioner can catch up with the
law he already knows.
"°°Burnett v. Word, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
O0 Ideal Baking Co. v. Boyd, 417 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Corpus Christi Hard-
ware Co. v. Farrar, 417 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Dina Pak Corp. v. May Aluminum,
Inc., 417 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Rotex Mfg. Co. v. Little Dude Trailer Co., 416
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
""Crothers v. Midland Prods. Co., 410 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See VanDercreek,
Texas Civil Procedure, this Survey, at footnote 3.
10'Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 412 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd
and rendered, 419 S.W.2d 345 (1967).
"' Finger Contract Supply Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 412 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref. n.r.e.
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